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NOTES
PARTIAL CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION: THE COMMON LAW
ANSWER IN THE TENANT'S STRUGGLE
FOR HABITABILTY
The threat of overpopulation, although not yet at the level of a
national emergency, has not gone unnoticed in our society.' The
symptoms are most obvious where the demand created by the spiraling
population cannot be satisfied with present resources. The shortage
of adequate housing in California is illustrative.' It does not appear
possible to construct enough new housing to accommodate the population,, and the resulting distribution over the present facilities creates
an unfair advantage on the part of those who own multifamily dwellings. These landlords, virtually assured of a high-paying lodger, may
manipulate the conditions of the premises and the lease in their favor.
The law, generally the equalizer in such circumstances, allows the landlord a relatively free rein and imposes liability only in extreme cases.
Thus, not only are many of the proposed facilities inadequate, but the
existing ones are being surcharged and allowed to deteriorate.
California, recognizing the gravity of the situation, has passed
statutes requiring the landlord to place the premises in a tenantable
condition, and to properly maintain them.4 This measure would prove
1. See generally Spengler, Population Pressure, Housing, and Habitat, 3 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 191 (1967).
2. Statistics, although mechanically unerring, tend to distort the exigency of
the problem. Even so, a closer examination of some can be illuminating. The 1960
Census showed that 11.1 percent of the dwellings in Los Angeles were excluded from
the "sound, with all plumbing facilities" category. Sacramento had 16.9 percent of
its housing below standard, and 17.5 percent of San Francisco's dwellings also failed to
meet the requirements. BUREAU OP THE CENSUS, U.S. DRE'T OF COMMECE, 1960
CENSUS oF HousiNG, 1 STATES AND SMALL AREAS 4-5 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960
CENSUS]. It is significant, however, that these percentages were higher among the
nonwhite population, who fall primarily into the lower income brackets. For example,
the same category of dwellings was found to be 17 percent in Los Angeles, 28.1 percent
in Sacramento, and 31.2 percent in San Francisco. These figures were even higher in
the smaller metropolitan areas densely populated with nonwhites. Stockton was found
to have 41.2 percent of its minority dwellings in substandard condition. Id. at 13.
This would seem to indicate that the burden falls heavily on the low-income tenant.
3. A recent study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
revealed that California must build 1.5 million new units by mid-1970. Of these, onehalf must be built for families with incomes under $8200 a year. If current predictions of 180,000 housing starts for 1969 are accurate, there will be a deficit of some
50,000 units by 1975. San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 21, 1968, § 1, at 13, col. 2.
4. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1941 provides that the lessor of a building intended for
[417]
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quite effective had the statute not contained a provision whereby the
protection offered could be waived by the inclusion of an "agreement to
the contrary."5 Almost without fail, leases recite such a waiver' and
the tenant is relegated to the same futile position he occupied under the
common law.
The purpose of this article will be to examine the tenant's remedies
where the action of the landlord has resulted in an interference with
the possession or useful enjoyment of the premises. The analysis will
reveal the glaring inadequacies of the recourses available to the tenant
and the dire need for positive reform. The optimum solution would
be legislative action, but the advent of a properly drafted statute does
not appear to be imminent. Therefore, it is suggested that an effective,
yet uncomplicated, interim solution would be a modification of the tenant's existing common law remedies; specifically, the remedy for eviction arising from a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Development of the Tenant's Basic Right: The
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
The tenant has long occupied a precarious legal position. Originally, the purpose of placing someone other than the owner in sole possession of the land was to provide an incentive to the occupant to cultivate it as if it were his own.7 Presumably, the result would be an increase in both the productivity of the land and the profit for the lord.'
Having relinquished possession of the land, the landlord was unwilling
to surrender anything more. Thus the tenant was said to take the
land at his own risk.9 The law imposed no duty upon the landlord to
transfer tenantable premises,'0 or to repair subsequent dilapidations. 1
human habitation must place the premises in a habitable condition and keep them in
repair. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1942 allows the tenant to expend up to one month's rent
on needed repairs in the event the landlord is unwilling to take action; in the alternative, the tenant may vacate and be absolved from further obligations under the lease.
5. Seldom will the amount of one month's rent be sufficient to repair the more
serious defects; thus CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 is of limited value. Section 1941 of the
Civil Code, however, places the burden of repair upon the landlord and could serve as a
primary source of statutory relief for the tenant. The inclusion of the clause, "in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary" subverts the very purpose of the statute,
and allows the landlord to avoid this liability simply by including a waiver clause
in his lease. Several attempts have been made to alter this, the most recent of which
would have upheld the landlord's duty to repair "notwithstanding an agreement to the
contrary." A.B. 2069 (1969). The defeat of this amendment, and others like it, can
in part be attributed to the landlords' powerful lobby.
6. In fact, most form leases used by the larger enterprises include such a
waiver clause automatically. E.g., General Office System Co., General Form Lease,
provision five, on file with The Hastings Law Journal.
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The tenant held the land under a lease, which was an anomalous
device from its inception. Being a transfer of land, it possessed the
characteristics of a conveyance; yet, the contractual aspect of the landlord-tenant relationship contributed another factor, which prevented
simple definition. The result was a division of authority, with some
courts considering the lease solely as a conveyance, 1 2 and others emphasizing its contractual nature."3
The lease, although designed to favor the landlord, ironically provided a basis for the first common law protection afforded the tenant.
The protection did not improve the tenant's position concerning the
safety of the premises, but it did strengthen his right to be there. The
law still would not allow the tenant a remedy if the roof fell in on his
head, but it would defend to the end his right to stand under it. This
limited protection came in the form of a convenant of quiet enjoyment, which initially warranted that the landlord had good title, and
that the tenant would not be ousted by any defect therein.' 4 Although
the covenant has never been extended to guarantee tenantability, it
is generally interpreted to include protection from interference with
either the possession or the use and enjoyment of the premises. 15
The covenant was sometimes found in the express language of
the lease, but its absence led the courts to imply its existence from the
very fact of the hiring. The implication arose upon the recitation of key
words such as "grant and demise," or "grant," or even "to lease." 16
As a result, all leases contain an express or implied covenant of quiet
12. See, e.g., In re Edgewood Park Junior College, 123 Conn. 74, 192 A. 561
(1937). "A lease is primarily a conveyance of an interest in land." Id. at 77, 192
A. at 562. Although such an interpretation is common, it is the source of a major
pitfall for the tenant. For example, if the premises are destroyed by fire, a strict adherence to the above does not absolve the tenant from the payment of rent, as the
subject matter of the conveyance is thought to be only the land.
13. See, e.g., Lewes Sand Co. v. Graves, 40 Del. 189, 8 A.2d 21 (1939). "A
lease is a contract by which one person divests himself of, and another takes possession of lands . . . ." Id. at 195, 8 A.2d at 24, quoting 1 H.G. WOOD, LANDLORD AND
Such an interpretation is significantly more
TENANT § 203, at 385 (2d ed. 1888).
lenient than the "conveyance interpretation," since it makes available to the tenant
the contract defenses of failure of consideration and frustration of purpose.
14. Conner v. Bernheimer, 6 Daly 295 (N.Y.C.P. 1875). 'This covenant [of
quiet enjoyment] is simply an assurance against the consequences of a defective title,
and of any disturbance by reason of such defect." Id. at 299.
15. See Hayner v. Smith, 63 Ill. 430(1872). 'The law implies covenants against
such acts of the landlord as destroy the beneficial enjoyment of the premises leased."
Id. at 432. Goldman v. House, 93 Cal. App. 2d 572, 209 P.2d 639 (1949), stated:
"An agreement to let upon hire is an agreement that the hirer may have quiet posession
of the thing hired." Id. at 576, 209 P.2d at 641. This is an abbreviated form of
California's codification of the covenant of quiet enjoyment in section 1927 of the
Civil Code.
16.

3 G. THompsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1129, at 470-71 (1959).
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enjoyment in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. 17
Actual Eviction as a Breach of the Covenant
Once the covenant insuring the tenant of quiet possession was
recognized, the question of what would constitute a breach of this
covenant arose. The logical answer: any physical ouster of possession;
such an ouster was termed an "eviction." The original interpretation
was limited to actual displacement by the landlord or one with paramount title.18 As will be shown later, however, this definition has not
remained static.
The effect of an eviction was twofold. Since it was formally a
breach of covenant, an action for damages accrued,1 9 unless the lessee
elected to consider the lease rescinded." Damages were limited to those
actually resulting from the ouster, but the tenant could assert them
affirmatively or as a defense to the landlord's suit for rent.2
An eviction, by definition, also meant the tenant had been deprived of his possession, which was regarded as the consideration for
the payment of rent.22 Consequently, the duty of paying rent was sus23
pended until such time as the premises were returned to the tenant.
Where the tenant was totally deprived of his possession, there could
be no other solution. The law did not become any less severe,
however, when the eviction, though actual, involved only a portion
of the premises. Even if the tenant retained enough land to inhabit
comfortably, he sustained no obligation to pay rent. Partial eviction
was legally equated with total eviction on the theory that rent was non17. See Georgeous v. Lewis, 20 Cal. App. 255, 128 P. 768 (1912).
"It may
be conceded generally that every lease in the usual and ordinary form carries with it
an implied covenant that the lessee will not be disturbed in his possession during the
term by the lessor nor any other person having the paramount title. This is so, however,
only in the absence of a stipulation in the lease to the contrary .....
Id. at 258,
128 P. at 769.
18. Donaldson v. Mona Motor Oil Co., 193 Minn. 283, 258 N.W. 504 (1935).
"The acts of the landlord to effectuate eviction must be something more than a mere
trespass . . . . The term 'eviction' was formerly used to denote an expulsion by the
assertion of a paramount title and by process of law, but it is now generally applied to
every class of expulsion or emotion." Id. at 287, 258 N.W. at 506, quoting in part
36 C.J. Landlord and Tenant § 979, at 255 (1924). See also Standard Livestock v.
Pentz, 204 Cal. 618, 625, 269 P. 645, 648 (1928) (covenant of quiet enjoyment
breached only by eviction).
19. 3 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1135, at 512 (1959).
20. Id.
21. McAlester v. Landers, 70 Cal. 79, 11 P. 505 (1886).
22. Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201 (1870).
"The eviction of a tenant
from the demised premises, either by the landlord or by title paramount, is a bar to
any demand for rent, because it deprives him of the whole consideration for which
rent was to be paid." Id. at 202.
23. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
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apportionable and automatically suspended from the point of any intrusion.2 4
A Logical Extension: Constructive Eviction
It eventually became clear that something could disturb the tenant's quiet enjoyment as effectively as actual eviction. The first judicial recognition of such a possibility appears in an early New York
case. Dyett v. Pendelton 5 was an action by a landlord to recover
rent in arrears. Although no actual ouster was averred, the defendant
denied liability, alleging that he had been evicted from the premises.
He introduced evidence tending to show that the landlord's practice of
encouraging several women of questionable character to frequent the
house cast a shadow of infamy upon it, thereby compelling the tenant
to vacate in the interest of morality. The court held that such interference did constitute an eviction even though the ouster was a product
of the tenant's discretion, not the result of physical deprivation by the
landlord. 6
Dyett v. Pendelton became a precedent for a new type of eviction-constructive eviction. Physical expulsion was no longer an indispensable requirement.2 7 The covenant of quiet enjoyment could be
breached by the landlord's interference with the use and enjoyment of
the premises. The decision represented a major contribution to the
tenant's common law remedies; but as always, the limits of such a
remedy had to be shaped by case law.
The California courts' treatment of the cases invoking this remedy is indicative of the transitional struggle in most jurisdictions. Because constructive eviction was a novel remedy, the courts were quite
naturally hesitant to employ it in every situation where the tenant
claimed interference.2 This reluctance led the courts to impose certain
qualifications that made the remedy highly complex.
First, the acts that were the cause of the tenant's removal had to
be those of the landlord, or someone acting under his instructions. 29
24. Giraud v. Milovich, 29 Cal. App. 2d 543, 85 P.2d 182 (1938). Where the
tenant was ousted from a portion of the demised premises, the court held that. "[the
tenant cannot be compelled to pay the rent reserved, for, in such a case, there can be
no apportionment of rent." Id. at 548, 85 P.2d at 185, quoting in part Skaggs v.
Emerson, 50 Cal. 3 (1875).
25. 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
26. Id. at 734.
27. See, e.g., Levitzky v. Canning, 33 Cal. 299 (1867); Schulte Realty Co. v.
Pulvino, 179 N.Y.S. 371 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
28. The courts usually denied the allegation of constructive eviction by determining that the acts complained of constituted only a trespass, which was never adequate as a basis for constructive eviction. Kelley v. Long, 18 Cal. App. 159, 122 P.
832 (1912).
29. See Sanders v. Allen, 83 Cal. App. 2d 362, 366, 188 P.2d 760, 763 (1948).
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In the absence of an agreement covering such intrusions, the acts of
third parties, no matter
how annoying, could not serve as a basis for
3°
constructive eviction.
Second, the tenant must show that the landlord intended to interfere with his quiet possession.3 1 However, this intent need not be an
actual, subjective intent and can be established by inference from the
character of the landlord's acts."
33
Third, the tenant must have been in possession of the premises,
and the acts complained of must have resulted in a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of those premises. 34 Anything less
than this degree of interference would be insufficient.3 5
Even when the interference is substantial and causally linked to the
landlord there can be no assertion of constructive eviction without the
tenant's removal from the premises. 30 Removal must be made within a
reasonable time or the tenant risks waiver despite eventual evacuation.37 The reason generally given for this is that the complaint by the
tenant alleges that the landlord has caused the premises to become untenantable, and that there can be no better proof of this than timely
30. See Bilicke v. Janss, 14 Cal. App. 342, 112 P. 201 (1910). "A constructive
eviction from a leasehold cannot be claimed by a tenant because of the acts of another tenant of a portion of the premises unless the landlord is responsible for what the
tenant does." Id. at 347, 112 P. at 202, quoting French v. Pettingill, 128 Mo. App.
156, 161, 106 S.W. 575, 577 (1907).
31. Blessing v. Fetters, 40 Cal. App. 471, 181 P. 108 (1919).
32. Pierce v. Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954). "But when it
is said that in order to constitute a constructive eviction, there must be an intent on
the part of the landlord to deprive the tenant of the premises, it is not meant that
there must exist an actual subjective intention in the mind of the landlord. It may
be inferred from the character of his acts if their natural and probable consequences
are such as to deprive the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the leased premises."
Id. at 613, 272 P.2d at 943.
33. Kline v. Guaranty Oil Co., 167 Cal. 476, 140 P. 1 (1914); Upton v. Toth, 36
Cal. App. 2d 679, 98 P.2d 515 (1940).
34. See Tregoning v. Reynolds, 136 Cal. App. 154, 28 P.2d 79 (1934). "[T]o
constitute a constructive eviction, it is essential that the acts complained of result in
depriving the lessee of a substantial as distinguished from an insignificant or inconsequential portion of the leased premises." Id. at 156, 28 P.2d at 80. Other cases noting
this requirement are Lindenberg v. MacDonald, 34 Cal. 2d 678, 214 P.2d 5 (1950);
Kelley v. Long, 18 Cal. App. 159, 122 P. 832 (1912).
35. There was some confusion where the landlord's acts were intentional and the
interference substantial, but in a sense privileged, as where the landlord instituted
a suit for unlawful detainer that proved unsuccessful. In Black v. Knight, 176 Cal. 722,
169 P. 382 (1917), the court held that the prosecution of an unlawful detainer suit in
good faith and without malice did not constitute an eviction, even though the tenant
did not retain possession of the premises for a substantial period of time.
36. Lori Ltd. v. Wolfe, 85 Cal. App. 2d 54, 192 P.2d 112 (1948); Coen v. Los
Angeles, 70 Cal. App. 752, 234 P. 426 (1925).
37. See Bakersfield Laundry Ass'n v. Rubin, 131 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865, 280
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removal.3 In addition, this requirement conveniently fulfills the dispossession factor traditionally inherent in eviction. 9
Notwithstanding these elaborate requirements, several disruptions
have served successfully as a basis for this remedy. These include
infestation of the premises with vermin,4 0 unreasonable delay in restoring the tenant to possession after making repairs, 4 removal of the
with other acts of harassment, 2
roof during the rainy season coupled
4 3 and others.4 4
interference with ingress and egress,
The Need for Distinction: Actual v. Constructive Eviction
That both actual eviction and constructive eviction are classified as
an "eviction" generates some confusion in differentiation and application. Where the landlord, or someone with paramount title, has
physically deprived the tenant of the entire premises, an actual eviction
has taken place. Any physical ouster less than this is a partial eviction.
ceases immediately,
In both cases, the liability of the tenant to pay rent
45
and is not revived for the duration of the eviction.
Where the disturbance involves the use and enjoyment of the premises, and is attributable to the acts or omissions of the landlord, the
character of the eviction is constructive, and the suspension of rent is
contingent upon the tenant's removal. 6
A concise summary of the court's application of the two types of
eviction is found in American Law Reports:
Most, if not all, the cases considering the question [of] when
the acts complained of constitute an actual partial, and when a
P.2d 921, 923 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1955), where it was stated that while one month
might be a reasonable time for removal, retention of the premises for half the period of
the lease could not be considered a reasonable time. Generally, the question is one of
fact.
38. It would seem that the abandonment must occur before the disturbing condition terminates or the tenant relinquishes his right to assert constructive eviction. Cf.
Sill Properties Inc. v. CMAG Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 42, 33 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1963).
39. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
40. Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct.
App. Dep't 1967).
41. Mills v. Richards, 84 Cal. App. 52, 257 P. 542 (1927).
42. Barkett v. Brucato, 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953).
43. Coen v. Los Angeles, 70 Cal. App. 752, 234 P. 426 (1925).
44. A major basis for constructive eviction occurs when a landlord breaches an
express covenant. Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155
P.2d 24 (1944) (restrictive covenant not to lease to similar enterprises); Morse v.
Tochterman, 21 Cal. App. 726, 132 P. 1055 (1913) (covenant to supply heat). But,
as has been noted in the text, such covenants are rarely included voluntarily by the
landlord. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
45. Lawrence v. Katcher, 117 N.Y.S. 876 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1909).
46. Id.
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constructive eviction, apparently apply as a test . . . whether the

act complained of results in the deprivation of some right or appurtenance to the premises to which the tenant was entitled, or whether
it constitutes merely an interference with the beneficial enjoyment
of the premises by the tenant; if the former, the act constitutes an
actual eviction; if the latter, it may constitute a constructive eviction although all wrongful acts of the lessor interfering with the
enjoyment of the 47premises by the lessee do not amount to a constructive eviction.
The crucial feature, however, is the requirement of removal in constructive eviction.
Hypothetical: A Typical Situation
As expressed at the outset, the purpose of this note is to examine the
tenant's common law remedies for interference by the landlord, and to
expose their inadequacies. This can best be done with the use of a
hypothetical. There are numerous bases for both types of eviction;
but for our purposes, attention will be directed to the tenant's supply
of heat and water. The common law, which never demanded that the
landlord transfer tenantable premises, did not require him to provide
either heat or water.4 8 The courts probably believed that the parties
could covenant for any such additional conveniences. The tenant, however, is often not in an effective bargaining position. He primarily
seeks shelter; where the vacancies are limited, he has no choice but to
accept the premises on the owner's terms. Frequently, the landlord
will not incur liability where he may just as profitably avoid it. The
result is an absence of express covenants in a lease for the supply of
heat, water, and other essentials."
The common law did recognize an exception where the apparatus
for furnishing heat or water was in the sole control of the landlord.
The courts would imply a covenant to supply heat or water, and thereby
justified the tenant's removal if one or both of the services failed.50 It
47. Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1369, 1377 (1922).
48. Slaughter v. Johnson, 128 Ill. App. 417 (1906).
49. The most comprehensive figures in California illustrating this are derived
from the 1960 Census, and may be somewhat dated considering the growth of the state
over a 10 year period. Figures from that study, however, show that out of a total of
some 4.5 million dwellings in urban areas, almost 50,000 had an inadequate supply of
water, and over 500,000 had faulty or inadequate heating. In all, 13.5 percent of all
the state's dwellings had some major defect in the heating or plumbing. See 1960
CENSUS, supra note 2, at 4, 14. A more recent study confined to San Francisco disclosed that 6 percent of that city's dwellings had one or more of its basic facilities
missing. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
MINORITY GROUP HOUSING PROBLEMS 12 (Feb. 1967).
50. E.g., Jackson v. Paterno, 128 App. Div. 474, 112 N.Y.S. 924 (Sup. Ct. App.

Div. 1908).
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is doubtful, however, that breach of such an implied covenant would
render the landlord amenable to a suit for damages. 51
Unfortunately, there is no California case directly in point indicating whether the interference by the landlord with heat or water
constitutes an actionable disturbance.
Nevertheless, there is enough
52
case law to indicate a tendency.
Let us assume that John Doe lives in a low-rent housing district
with his family. Though his dwelling is small and not in the best of
repair, it does have the plumbing necessary for hot and cold running
water, and is provided with a heating unit from the central heating
system.
For this apartment Mr. Doe pays a substantial rent, but can find
nothing better for the price. 53 Every morning, when Mr. Doe rises, he
must wait patiently for an adequate supply of water for shaving,
showing, and cooking, because the corroded condition of the pipes, and
a similar demand by the other tenants, reduce the water pressure to a
mere dribble. Mr. Doe is also careful to wear adequate clothing; the
heating unit (which is central and beyond his control) does not operate
until 8 A.M.
After Mr. Doe has endured these morning tribulations, the rest
of his family must follow in patient succession, in a fashion similar to
that of other tenants in the building, and those in the general area.
The situation presented is hardly an unbearable one, but it is certainly
an interference with Mr. Doe's enjoyment, especially in light of the inflated rent.
Employment of Existing Remedies
Suppose Mr. Doe seeks some sort of redress in a California court.
There are no express covenants in his lease pertinent to his action, and
by his signature he has agreed to waive all his rights under Civil Code
51. See id.
52. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra. The absence of a case in point is
fairly indicative of the need for reform. Perhaps the explanation is that there is no
remedy presently available that would encourage him to bring such a suit.
53. "Excessive payments for rent are made by a substantial number of households,
including minorities, the elderly, and others. From 20-25 percent is assumed as a
maximum a family can afford. But the number of renter-households paying as much
as 35 percent or more of their income ranges from 16.7 percent in Bakersfield to as
high as 23.5 percent in San Diego. Almost 40,000 renter-households in 10 standard
metropolitan SMSA's [standard metropolitan statistical area] in 1960 paid 35 percent
or more of their income for their shelter ....
"Despite the payment of rents disproportionate to family incomes, many of the
houses for which this excessive rent is paid are below standard. In fact, 57,824 of
these housing units were unsound and more than 130,000 were occupied by folk with
the family head more than 65 years of age." GovERNOR's ADVISORY COMMISSION

ON HousING

PROBLEMS, REPORT ON HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA 10 (Jan. 1963).
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sections 1941 and 1942. 4 He therefore has no statutory or contractual
remedy directly in his favor. Any relief must necessarily stem from his
basic rights as a lessee. The primary right guaranteed a tenant by the
common law and codified in Civil Code section 1927 is the covenant of
quiet enjoyment. The mere fact of the hiring raises this covenant. 5
The only legally recognized breach is some form of eviction.5 6 Thus,
Mr. Doe's success depends on the discovery of factors characteristic of
an eviction.
It may be assumed that Mr. Doe has no basis for alleging actual
eviction; there is no physical dispossession, and all California cases in
this area have required such an ouster.5 7 However, it is possible that
the courts would consider such an interference a constructive eviction.
The case law at present would lend itself to this type of extension. For
example, the California cases repeatedly hold that any substantial interference with the beneficial use and enjoyment will amount to a constructive eviction providing the tenant removes. 8 Certainly the absence of heat or water could reasonably amount to such an interferenceIn Clark v. Koesheyan,50 the court allowed the tenant to remove
and assert constructive eviction where the landlord had obstructed the
light, air, and water. A more recent case held that the interference
with the tenant's parking facilities and water storage compartment by
a subsequent purchaser of a portion of the landlord's premises amounted
to a constructive eviction, even though the lease recited no express
reservations concerning the land involved." The court stated that the
use of the parking and storage facilities were "reasonably necessary"
for the useful occupancy of the premises, and thus a substantial interference with these would be grounds for a constructive-eviction."'
Adequacy of Remedy
In all probability, then, the courts would extend constructive evic54. See note 5 supra.
55. McDowell v. Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 48 P. 984 (1897); Goldman v. House,
93 Cal. App. 2d 572, 209 P.2d 639 (1949).
56. See note 18 supra. There are, however, a few decisions to the contrary.
E.g., Moe v. Sprankle, 32 Tenn. App. 33, 221 S.W.2d 712 (1948).
57. Skaggs v. Emerson, 50 Cal. 3 (1875) (landlord refused to relinquish possession of a cottage on the demised premises); Camarillo v. Fenlon, 49 Cal. 202
(1874) (physical ouster of 200 acres of land held to be an eviction); Giraud v. Milovich, 29 Cal. App. 2d 543, 85 P.2d 182 (1938) (landlord deeded away 20-foot strip
of demised premises to state for the construction of a highway).
58. See, e.g., Veysey v. Moriyama, 184 Cal. 802, 195 P. 662 (1921); Pierce v.
Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954); Blessing v. Fetters, 40 Cal. App.
471, 181 P. 108 (1919).
59. 26 Cal. App. 305, 146 P. 904 (1915).
60. Sierad v. Lilly, 204 Cal. App. 2d 770, 22 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1962).
61. Id. at 773, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 582.

January 19701

PARTIAL CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION

427

ion to Mr. Doe's situation. But the essential problem turns upon the
adequacy of the remedy-whether this extension of constructive eviction to Mr. Doe has made his plight any easier. The answer, regrettably,
is in the negative.
Constructive eviction evolved as a relaxation of the common law 2
at a time when housing was relatively abundant.63 Its purpose was to
absolve the tenant of his obligations under the lease, and allow him to
remove to a more desirable location.
The pressures of the 20th century have substantially negated
the effectiveness of constructive eviction as a tenant remedy. The expanding population, the migration to urban areas and the ensuing housing shortage have made the tenant's procurement of adequate housing
difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, the tenant is likely to
accept certain inadequacies rather than expend more for proper accommodations, or struggle to find better housing in the same price range.
Thus, many tenants are currently enduring conditions that might well
constitute a basis for constructive eviction.
Even if the tenant does elect to avail himself of constructive eviction, the same factors that force other tenants to endure also operate to
make the recourse somewhat of a gamble.64 If the tenant removes and
it is later judicially determined that he did so without cause, he remains
liable on the lease in addition to incurring the expense of finding new
habitation. If he desires to use constructive eviction as a threat to
improve his present living condition, he risks retaliatory eviction by
the landlord. 65 The common law allowed the landlord to evict the tenant without reason, or upon such trivial grounds that it amounted to a
discretionary power.66
Of course the tenant can claim a breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment and bring an action for damages. But this requires the instigation of a lawsuit, which, in most cases, is beyond the understanding
and financial ability of the tenant.6
In addition, the relief, if any,
62.

See note 12 supra.

63. Dyett v. Pendelton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827), regarded as the genesis
of constructive eviction, was decided in 1827. A frequently cited successor is Chrisopher v. Austin, 11 N.Y. 216 (1854).
64. For discussions of this dilemma see Charlotte Theaters Inc. v. Gateway Co.,
191 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 1961); Charles E. Burt Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340
Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959).

65. See generally Note, Retaliatory Eviction-Is California Lagging Behind?,
18 HASTINS L.J. 700 (1967).
66. E.g., Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 85 N.E.2d 435 (1949).
67. See generally Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1965). Even if the tenant were to institute a suit
and win, the damages would probably be insufficient to cover the necessary repairs.
Id. at 313.
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would be minimal because the covenants in a lease are generally held
to be independent, and the tenant would remain liable on all other obli8
gations of the lease.1
From the above discussion, it would appear that the common law
offers no contemporary relief for the tenant. The right to remove when
he is fortunate to have found shelter, and the right to institute costly
damage suits for what will most likely be insufficient judgments seem
valueless for tenants like Mr. Doe.
Statutory Solutions
Mr. Doe's dilemma is not unknown in other jurisdictions, and
various solutions have been proposed. Some states have resorted to legislative action. Retaining the interference with heat and water as an
example, a Connecticut statute illustrates the progress in this area. It
provides:
When any building or part thereof is occupied as a home or place
of residence . . . a temperature of less than sixty eight degrees
• . . shall . . . be deemed injurious to the health of the occupants thereof .

. .

.

The owner of any building

. .

.

the lease or

rental agreement whereof, by its terms, express or implied, requires
the furnishing of heat, hot water or light to any occupant of such
building or part thereof, who, wilfully and intentionally, fails to
furnish such heat to the degrees herein provided, hot water or light
and thereby interferes with the comfortable or quiet enjoyment of
the premises . . . shall be fined ....

19

Massachusetts law requires a determination by the board of health
that the water supply is inadequate. Upon such a finding, the landlord is required to remedy the situation or be subject to a fine.7" New
York, which feels the burden of the housing shortage perhaps more than
any other jurisdiction at the present7 1 time, has elaborate legislative measures to alleviate the tenant's plight. '
68. 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 686 (1960); 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 890 (3d ed. 1962). Some authors have analyzed the doctrine of constructive eviction as a covert attempt to make the covenants in a lease dependent. See Bennett, The
Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Damages for Anticipatory Breach

and Interdependency of Covenants), 16 TEXAS L. REV. 47 (1938). While this would
seem to be an adequate explanation, it does not account for the requirement of removal by the tenant. A purely contractual interpretation would suspend the rent immediately upon breach by the landlord, regardless of the tenant's removal.
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-65 (Supp. 1969). It should be noted that the statute contains the words "wilful and intentional." This does not mean that the act of the
landlord must be affirmative. The statute is criminal in nature and the words are included to preclude a conviction for mere negligence. The statute creates a duty on
the part of the landlord; the breach of this duty, by act or omission, will confer criminal liability. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 595 (2d ed. 1969).
70. MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 122a (1967).
71. The New York Multiple Dwelling Law is quite comprehensive in its coy-
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Judicial Solutions
Legislation is the most direct method to remedy the situation,
but it is also the most difficult to procure.7 2 The real solution should
stem from the elasticity of the common law and the imagination of the
courts.7" Some courts have attempted just such a step, particularly in
New York.
In Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer74 the dwelling of the tenant had
been extensively damaged by fire. Because of the severe housing shortage, he could not find a place to relocate, and was forced to inhabit

only a small portion of his fire-damaged apartment. The landlord
brought an action for rent for a period inclusive of this displacement.
The court acknowledged the necessity of removal for a defense of constructive eviction, but suggested that such a requirement should be relaxed where the housing shortage precludes compliance. 75 The court
further stated that since the tenant was unable to use a large portion of
the premises, there was an abandonment sufficient to satisfy the removal
erage of the facilities and general upkeep of the tenements in the state. Some of the
statutory requirements are as follows: Section 75 requires an adequate water supply;
section 76, a water closet and bath accommodations; section 77, adequate plumbing and
drainage; and section 79, proper heating. In addition, section 302a, entitled the Rent
Abatement Act, allows the tenant to withhold rent if there exists on the premises a
"rent impairing violation." Section 309 calls for the appointment of a receiver to make
any necessary repairs on the tenement where it is found to be "a serious threat to health
and safety." The receiver is then granted a lien that has priority over all liens or mortgages until paid. The most controversial provision is the so-called Spiegel Law, section 143-b of the New York Social Welfare Law, which allows welfare officials to withhold rental allotments for the welfare recipients living in buildings which are "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to health or life."
Additional solutions are found in the American Bar Foundation's tentative draft
of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code:
"If the landlord fails to provide a reasonable amount of water or . . . heat
[in the colder months] to the roomer, boarder, or apartment building tenant, when the
building is equipped for the purpose, the tenant may:
(a) upon written notice to the landlord, immediately terminate the rental agreement, or
(b) upon notice to the landlord, procure adequate substitute housing for as long
as heat or water is not supplied, during which time the rent shall abate and the landlord
shall be liable for any additional expense incurred by the tenant up to [one half] the
amount of the abated rent." AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-207(2) (Tent. Draft 1969).
72. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
73. The willingness of the courts to devise new remedies from the common law
has recently been demonstrated by the rise of the implied warranty of habitability.
See generally Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CONN. L. REv. 61 (1969).
This warranty was viewed favorably in a recent California decision. See Buckner v.
Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1967).
74. 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1946).
75. id. at 197.
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requirement, at least regarding the damaged portion.7 6 This was
termed a "partial constructive eviction," which did not absolve the tenant from the whole
of the rent, but did allow a substantial reduction
77
of his liability.
A subsequent case with remarkably similar facts also aroused the
court's sympathy in favor of the tenant. 8 Here too, the court, in an
emotionally charged opinion, advocated the elimination of the removal
requirement. Since the tenant did not remove, however, he was
held liable for a reduced rent. 9
An entirely different approach was taken by another New York
court. In Levanthal v. Strauss" the landlord had built a porch above
the tenant's windows and substantially obstructed the light and air.
Traditionally, such interference would be with the use and enjoyment of
the premises, and thus provide grounds only for a constructive eviction. Rather than struggle with the intricacies of constructive eviction,
however, the court held that such an interference constituted an actual
partial eviction, and the rent was suspended from that point without a
requirement of removal.8"
Another case following this same line of reasoning is a 1969 New
York case, in which a landlord's deprivation of air-conditioning facilities
in a sealed, highrise office building was at issue.82 The landlord refused to supply the tenant, who happened to be a lawyer, with circulated fresh air on weekends and after normal business hours. The
offices became stuffy and allegedly untenantable. Again, tradition
would indicate that the tenant would be limited to constructive eviction. Nevertheless, the court found a8 3partial eviction, and required no
removal for the full suspension of rent.
These cases are by no means a conclusive argument for an im76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Johnson v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1950).
79. The case did not absolve the tenant from the payment of rent in full, nor did
it eliminate the removal requirement in constructive eviction. A subsequent case
utilized Johnson v. Pemberton as authority for the proposition that a tenant who remains in possession of damaged premises retains liability in spite of almost intolerable
conditions. Coppola v. Tidewater Oil Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 127, 244 N.Y.S.2d 898
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1963).
80. 197 Misc. 798, 95 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1950).
81. Id. at 800, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
82. Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 31 App. Div. 342, 298
N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
83. The traditional viewpoint was urged by the dissenting judges. They regarded
the situation as constituting only a basis for constructive eviction, and were in favor of
finding for the landlord in the absence of a removal by the tenant. Id. at 344-47, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 156-58.
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mediate reversal of the law as it now stands. At most, they indicate
that the problem of the tenant's lack of effective remedies at common
law has reached a stage where the courts can no longer ignore it, but
must attempt some revision.
Conclusion
In light of the inadequacy of the tenant's remedies, fostered mainly
by their obsolescence, it is submitted that what is needed is a new
remedy, a totally new legal device, which would protect the tenant from
the potential oppression present in many leases. Given the evolutionary process of the common law, an effective device might be contrived
from a synthesis of the tenant's rights upon eviction where the covenant
of quiet enjoyment has been breached. The name "partial constructive
eviction" might be borrowed from the New York court8 4 that first
recognized its need, although the similarity would be only superficial.
What is required today is a far more comprehensive type of relief.
Synthesizing the two types of eviction yields just such a product. If
the tenant were allowed a remedy whereby the grounds for constructive
eviction provided the same relief as does partial eviction, his burden
would be mitigated. An interference with the use and enjoyment of the
premises would then result in the total and automatic supsension of his
rental obligation, independent of his removal. This would essentially
guarantee him either adequate living conditions or an effective legal
alternative. In turn, pressure would be exerted upon the landlord to
keep the premises in repair despite the leniency of the common law or
any statutory waiver. To fail to do so would result in a decrease, if not
a total abatement, of the landlord's income.
This remedy should not be without limitations. The same requirements of substantiality and causality necessary for constructive eviction should be retained to preclude a clogging of the docket with trivial
or unfounded complaints. But the tenant who possesses a just complaint and who would be unable to comply with the removal requirement
of constructive eviction for financial or other reasons, would have access
to a common law remedy that would offer very tangible, much needed
relief.8s
Such a measure is at present only a suggested solution, and in
California, a highly theoretical one. The author is not so naiive as to
84. Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1946).
85. The suggested remedy's effectiveness is contingent upon some limitation of
the landlord's power to evict, or some means by which the tenant could counteract a
retaliatory eviction. Connecticut has indicated a possible solution by giving the tenant
an affirmative defense in an action for summary process if the eviction resulted from
the tenant's efforts to improve his living conditions through proper legal channels.
Public Act. No. 315, [1969] Conn. Acts 339.
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predict the immediate, or even the eventual, adoption of such a remedy.
But, as was evidenced by the rise of products liability, the courts are
not impervious to rather dramatic reversals, and will perhaps consider
the proposed solution when the factors mentioned above force a similar
change in the field of landlord-tenant.
David M. Buoncristiani*
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